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Abstract: How the degree of inequality affects the global patterns people follow when they have
to collectively mitigate the threads of air pollution is the main topic of this study. We propose an
alternative method to analyse the differences in the global behavioral patterns using experimental
data from the xAire citizen science project which included two frames differentiated by the unequal
distribution of resources. The method has been shown useful and we found that the degree of in-
equality does not determine the composition of population according behavioral patterns. Moreover,
more than 50% of the people based their actions on what others people’s already decided in such
context thus following a moody and adaptive behaviour.
I. INTRODUCTION
As society we are facing more collectives risk situations
(climate change or air pollution, Core Writing Team and
(eds.), 2014) which requires to understand the way people
acts in order to design the most efficient policies to reduce
such risks. In this study we analyse data obtained from
a lab-in-the-field public experiment, designed to generate
a tension at people which have to decide between con-
tributing in a common fond to reduce the consequences
of the air pollution, or keeping the money by themselves
and leaving the rest of the group paying the cost and
contributing over the fair (Milinski et al., 2008).
The experiment reproduces inequality by giving an un-
equal distribution of resources at the beginning of the
game. We understand that all monetary decisions are
always done in a frame of inequality and it determines
the way individuals behave (Burton-Chellew, May, and
West, 2013). Analyse how decisions change according the
degree of inequality is the final objective of this study.
We expect that the decisions of people are also con-
ditioned by the decisions that others take (Fischbacher,
Gächter, and Fehr, 2001). We will be able to capture the
degree at which people reacts to the previous decisions
which allows to understand the interactions between the
individual and the group as a particle in a thermal bath.
We think that our conclusions are especially useful to
policy-makers as it allows them to better understand the
context of dealing with social risks that requires of a col-
lective effort.
In terms of the literature related with the collective ac-
tion we must mention the work of Fischbacher, Gächter,
and Fehr, 2001 where the authors used a single shot Pub-
lic Goods Game (PGG) to identify a particular group of
behavioral patterns by asking to the participants of the
experiment how much they were willing to contribute to
a common fond according the contributions of the rest of
hypothetical participants. They found that 50% of peo-
ple behave as a “conditional cooperator” and 30% as a
“free-rider”. The rest were “altruists” (contributes un-
conditionally), “hump-shape” type (conditionally coop-
erative since a certain threshold where players start to
reduce their contributions), and the “unclassified cate-
gory “various”.
The behavioral analysis has a long tradition with many
papers reviewing the work of Fischbacher, Gächter, and
Fehr, 2001. However, we have been particularly inspired
by two papers Fallucchi et al., 2017 and Fallucchi et al.,
2018 where the authors first redefine the classic strategies
of free-rider, altruist, hump-shape, conditional coopera-
tor and various by own maximizer (OM), unconditional
cooperator (UC), strong and weak conditional coopera-
tor (SCC and WCC), and mid-range or various (V). And
second, they found the same patterns using the hierarchi-
cal clustering method which reinforces their behavioral
classification. We are going to go deep through this new
classification in this study.
Such behavioral studies have been done in the frame of
the traditional Public Goods Game (PGG) defined in the
frame of game theory. In recent years some researchers
have adapted the PGG to simulate in a more proper way
problems related with what is called a Collective-Risk
Dilemma (CRD). A CRD experiment consists in a group
of people having to solve, together, a risk by attaching
a certain monetary goal through contributions along T
rounds. If they do not success in this task they lose
everything they have earned. The individuals in the CRD
do not know a priori which strategy can be the best one
to finally keep the maximum profit.
The benchmark in terms of the experimental design of
the CRD was provided by Milinski and coauthors (Milin-
ski et al., 2008). They proposed a ten shots game where
groups of six individuals had to decide how many tokens
wanted to contribute to a common fund at each round.
They introduced inequality in their experiment modify-
ing the initial endowment distribution and the loss rate
in case of not fulfilling the objective. They found that
games with a high loss rate performs better in terms of
success rate (games succeeding in fulfilling the objective
over the total number of games) and at same time less
people played free rider strategies.
Other studies as Tavoni et al., 2011, Burton-Chellew,
May, and West, 2013 and Waichman et al., 2018 have also
tried to answer the same question, that is, which con-
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text (heterogeneous or homogeneous) is better to fulfill
common objectives in a collective dilemma? The results
provided in the literature give two opposite answers. The
first one is that homogeneous games (situations were all
participants have equal initial endowment) has a higher
success rate than the heterogeneous games. Tavoni et al.,
2011 and Burton-Chellew, May, and West, 2013 coincide
with this result. However, other studies as Milinski et
al., 2008 and Waichman et al., 2018 defend that hetero-
geneities can gives better results in terms of success rate
and cooperation in the games.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMALISM
The mathematical formalism behind the CRD is ex-
plained in detail at Waichman et al., 2018. Let’s review
the formalism for heterogeneous games (endowment in-
equality). We have n players and the game has T rounds.
The contribution of each player is defined as cit, that is,
the contribution of subject i (i = 1, . . . , n) at round t.
The contribution vector is build as ci = (ci1, . . . , ciT )
and the total contribution profile as c = (c1, . . . , cn).
c˜i =
∑t=T
t=1 cit is the total contribution of each individual.
For the high inequality treatment (UH) two players
receive 60 MU (aH) and the rest 30 MU (aL) (for the
low inequality treatment (UL) four players receive 48 MU
and 24 MU the rest). Let j(i) represent the type (L or
H), then utility Ui,j(i)(c˜) is the utility of player i being
of type j(i) under contribution profile c˜. In this case we
can asume that to succeed in the CRD, on average half
of he endowment will be spent by all players.
We use p to denote the probability of a loss occurring
if total contributions fall short of a particular threshold
A ≡ n/22 (aL + aH), and q to denote the loss rate of the
subjects’ final wealth if a catastrophe occurs.
The utility U(aj(i) then is defined:
U(aj(i) − c˜i) if
n∑
i=1
c˜i ≥ A ≡ n/2
2
(aL + aH) (1)
(1− p)U(aj − c˜i) + pU((1− q)(aj − c˜i)) if
n∑
i=1
c˜i < A ,(2)
In this case, the non contribution equilibrium holds.
The utility is given by:
Ui,j(i)(0, . . . , 0) = (1− p)U(aj(i)) + pU((1− q)aj(i))
The catastrophe prevention equilibrium has a profile
c∗ that holds for the following equations:









(2aL + aH) ≡ A (4)
U(aj(i) − c˜∗t ) ≥ (1− p)U(aj(i)) + pU((1− q)aj(i)) (5)
This would be in schematic terms the mathemati-
cal oriented approach behind the experiments we are
analysing.
III. METHODS
The experimental data used in this study was gath-
ered from two CRD experiments organized by the UB
Physics group OpenSystems one done at park Ciutadella
the and the other at CCCB, both done between April
and June of 2018 in Barcelona. From the CCCB we have
23 games (138 participants) and 42 (252 participants)
from Ciutadella (the data cleaning process is provided in
Appendix).
Our objective is to detect the change in the composi-
tion of population in terms of global behaviors when the
degree of inequality is modified. To do so we are not go-
ing to focus only on the statistical differences among the
macro variables of the game (proportional distribution,
total contribution distribution, …) as it is mostly done in
the literature related with the CRD. But we are going
to classify all participants in one of the five categories
defined by Fallucchi et al., 2017 and we will compare the
relative volumes of people classified at each strategy in
the UH and UL treatments.
The specific strategies we are going to look for are: a)
strong conditional cooperator (SCC), that is a players
who matches in most of the game the average contri-
bution made by the other players in the round before.
b) weak conditional cooperator (WCC) which matches
half of the time the average contribution of the players
the round before. The other behavioral patterns are c)
the own maximizer (OM), that is, a person which does
not contribute most of the time expecting to maximize
their earnings, and d) the unconditional cooperator (UC)
which is the one that contributes the maximum most of
the rounds independently of what others do. If a pattern
does not fit to any of the last four we classify them as d)
mid range or various (V).
To classify participants we propose the use of two in-
dices which will capture the responsive behavior to oth-
ers contributions and the level of altruism they show
along the game. The first one is the Pearson Correlation
(PC) between two series, the contribution at round t and
the average contribution per game for all participants at
round t - 1. The PC have a range from -1 to 1 which in
terms of cooperation would mean that people is a con-
ditional cooperator when PC is close to 1, a conditional
defective if PC is negative, and a non conditional coop-
erator if the PC rounds 0. In our experiment only a 7.9%
of the sample has negative PC and 71% of them fall in
the rage (-1/3, 0) which are the non cooperators. So, to
simplify the analysis we decided to do the absolute value
of the PC index to keep the range between 0 and 1. On
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the other side there is what we define as the Contribution
Index (CI) which is the average contribution per round
and of each individual before the objective is fulfilled over
4 which is the maximum possible contribution people can
do. In this way we have an index which also goes from
0 to 1. The combination of both indices in ranges allows
to classify people in one of the five strategies we have
mentioned (SCC, WCC, OM, UC and MG).
Once all participants are assigned in one of the behav-
ioral groups we can test the statistical differences of our
classification across treatments. The results of such test
will say if the degree of inequality has an impact or not
to the behavioral patterns people follow. The test we
used is the Mann–Whitney test (as in Waichman et al.,
2018) which precisely allows to compare the frequency
distribution of strategies we have for each treatment.
To check our classification we review the statistical
differences (also using the Mann–Whitney test) in the
proportional contribution distribution among strategies,
the evolution of the average normalized contribution per
strategy with the standard error and finally the rela-
tion between strategies and the initial endowment. This
methodology tries to give alternatives to the unsuper-
vised cluster analysis used in behavioral experiments.
When you let people interact in more than two rounds
the amount of noise increase and clustering methods tend
to perform less accurate.
IV. RESULTS
The first step is to classify players according to the
categories defined in the last section. We computed the
PC and the CI for each player and then we cross both
indices in the heatmap of Figure 1. The division in ranges
allows us to identify individuals that behave similarly
in terms of their cooperation and contribution patterns.
The amount of ranges was decided based on the best
characterization of the resulting groups.
Then, we did the classification of players according to
their propensity to conditionally cooperate and their de-
gree of contribution. To do so we assign each box plotted
in the heatmap to a particular behavior. The classifica-
tion by ranges follows the rules defined in the Table I.
OM SCC WCC UC MR
PC [0, 1] (2/3, 1] (1/3, 2/3] [0, 2/3] [0,1/3]
CI [0, 1/3] (1/3, 1] (1/3, 2/3] (2/3, 1] (1/3, 2/3]
TABLE I: Assignation of each player to a behavior accord-
ing the ranges of the Pearson correlation coefficient and the
Contribution Index.
This classification does not take into account the inter-
sections between strategies. For example we could con-
sider the people which has a PC bigger than 2/3 and
a CI bigger than 2/3 as SCC-UC which would be a new
strategy itself (there are 60 players which would be classi-
FIG. 1: Heatmap with the relation between the Pearson cor-
relation coefficient and the contribution index in ranges.
fied as such). To reduce the complexity of the behavioral
analysis we reduce the classification to the one defined
before. The results in terms of % of individuals which
play mostly the same strategy are summarized in Table
II.
global UH UL
OM 10.0 % 9.8 % 10.4 %
SCC 38.7 % 41.1 % 34.7 %
WCC 19.7 % 17.1 % 24.3 %
UC 22.3 % 24.0 % 19.4 %
MR 9.2 % 8.1 % 11.1 %
TABLE II: % of players classified at each strategy.
Now we can see if both treatments determines the
distribution of individuals across the different strate-
gies. The results of the Mann-Whitney rank test for the
two distributions of the frequency is: statistic=7.0 and
pvalue=0.1481349, which implies that we can not discard
the null hypothesis that both populations are equal. This
result implies that we can not differentiate between the
UH and the UL treatment so we will use all participants
for the following analysis.
We can also compare our results with the ones found
at Fallucchi et al., 2017 and Fallucchi et al., 2018, the in-
formation is summarized in table III. We can see that we
have close results for the SCC, WCC and MR behavior.
Once we have the players classified in one of the five
behavioral patterns then we can look for common charac-
teristics of such groups. Actually we analyse three met-
rics. First, the distribution of the proportional contribu-
tion by strategy. In this case we applied first a normality
test to the distributions. As only one distribution (out of
five) did not fit the normal distributions then we applied
the Mann-Whitney rank test. The results we found were
that the populations which follow the SCC and WCC
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our results Fallucchi2017 Fallucchi2018
OM 10.0 % 31.1 % 25.8 %
SCC 38.7 % 28.4 % 38.8 %
WCC 19.7 % 25.7 % 18.9 %
UC 22.3 % 4.0 % 4.7 %
MR 9.2 % 10.8 % 11.8 %
TABLE III: Comparison with x and y % of players classified
at each strategy.
pattern can not be statistically differentiated of MR (in
the case of SCC and MR the p-value was less than 10%).
Then we analysed the evolution of the averge contribu-
tion by strategy and the relation with the initial endow-
ment. Both are basic magnitudes in the analysis of this
kind of experiments. We can see the results of the evo-
lution of the total average contribution per round (with
the error-bars representing the standard error) at Figure
2.
FIG. 2: Line plot with the average normalized contribution
per strategy and the standard error in the errorbars.
The evolution of the contributions gives good insights
about the characteristics of the patterns. For example
we have checked that the conditional cooperators tend
to play more strategically and contributes more at the
beginning and less in the ending rounds. The weak co-
operators follow the same pattern but with a smoother
shape. The players categorized as Mid-Range seems to
sustain their contributions along all the game regardless
if the objective is fulfilled.
Figure 3 shows the relation between the initial en-
dowment of all individuals and their assigned strategies.
Strategies does not keep strong correlation with the ini-
tial endowment, although we can see that 66% of the
SCC had an initial endowment of 24 or 30 MU and 70%
of the people with 60 MU behaved as SCC (31%) and
UC (39%).
FIG. 3: Heatmap with the relation between the initial endow-
ment and the strategy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Participants of CRD can be classified according to their
behavioral patterns. We have found that in the context of
reducing the air pollution an important amount of peo-
ple reacts to others’ contributions (Strong Conditional
Cooperator + Weak Conditional Cooperator = 58.4%)
and that there are more people committed to contribute
regardless of the others (Unconditional Cooperator =
22.3%) than people which tries to avoid the sacrifice and
earn the maximum amount of money (Own Maximizer =
10.0%). The smallest group in terms of population is the
Mid-Range with a 9.2%. Such classification is coherent
with the results found in the literature (Fallucchi et al.,
2017 and Fallucchi et al., 2018).
Moreover, once we classified all participants we looked
at the possible statistical differences among treatments
for the different proportional volumes of players in the
different strategies, and we found: first, a change in the
degree of inequality does not change the global behav-
ioral patterns of people. And second, the classification
results obtained does not statistically differ from the ones
found in the literature. Such last finding reinforces the
significance of the PC and the CI as a mechanism to
characterize players associating them to a particular be-
havior.
To ensure that our classification is robust we reviewed
three different magnitudes associated with the game as
they are the proportional contribution distribution, the
evolution of the normalized contributions for each strat-
egy and the relation between the strategies and the initial
endowment of participants. The statistically significant
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differences in the proportional contribution have and the
different recognizable patterns in the evolution of the av-
erage contribution per strategy have shown a significant
differentiation among the strategies which reinforced the
robustness of our methods. The initial endowment has
given interesting insights as it is the people with few re-
sources (24 and 30 MU) are more sensitive to other par-
ticipants contributions (behaving as conditional cooper-
ators or own maximizers mostly) and people with a high
endowment tends to contribute in a more altruistic way
in the frame of the air pollution dilemma.
As a conclusion, in this study we have applied a new
methodology which has been successful in clarifying the
patterns associated to particular behaviors, only using
the contributions that individuals made along ten rounds.
It has allowed to do a classification of all the partici-
pants facilitating the posterior analysis and comparison
between treatments (that is, between different degrees of
inequality). Moreover, we have shown that our method-
ology can be an alternative to unsupervised clustering
methods (Fallucchi et al., 2018 or Vicens et al., 2018). In
fact, we tried to apply K-Means and Hierarchical cluster-
ing and both methods fail in recognizing the clear pat-
terns our methodology offers.
Many things have been left for the sake of the exten-
sion. A complementary analysis with unsupervised clus-
tering methods, a deeper characterization of the behavior
in the different periods of the game, or the inclusion of
more features in the analysis (as the answers of a final




The first condition was to eliminate all players which
did not finish the game, and the games in which those
players were (3 games at CCCB dataset and 4 at Ciu-
tadella). It was necessary to have all games with the
same amount of players to be able to aggregate results.
The second one was to eliminate those games which had
some kind of problem with their information (2 games at
Ciutadella had the total contribution equal zero accord-
ing the system while players actually did contributions).
The last condition was a criteria to determine outliers of
the dataset. We used the total contribution distribution
and we eliminate those games which fall out two stan-
dard deviations of the distribution (we dropped 2 games
at Ciutadella and 3 at CCCB). The results of the normal
approximation are: average total contribution = 132.2
MU, standard deviation of the total = 12.7 MU and the
validity range with two sd = [106.78 MU, 157.70 MU]. We
finally drop the EQUAL treatment games as they were
not statistically significant to compare with the rest of
treatments. At the end we have 65 games and 390 play-
ers and two treatments.
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